| My name is Nigel Cameron. I have worked for 20 years in bioethics, founded
the journal Ethics and Medicine in 1983, and am currently involved
in bioethics projects in both Europe and the US. It is a privilege to be
invited to testify today.
Two great questions confront the human race at the start of the biotech
century. The second, presently only on the horizons of our thinking and
yet of incalculable import, will focus our growing capacity to design,
determine, transform ourselves and our nature; the incremental progression
toward the so-called "post-human" future. The first question is the
one that confronts us today: whether we should use members of our own kind,
Homo sapiens sapiens, in whatever stage of biological existence, for a
purpose that is other than the good of the individual concerned; whether
we should sanction the use of ourselves, in however early a form, as
experimental subjects whose final end is destruction.
Let me offer four observations on our dilemma.
First, it seemed until recently to be widely agreed that human embryos
should never be manufactured simply in order to be destroyed through
experiment, however worthy the experiment. This principle is, for example,
enshrined in the European Convention on Biomedicine and Human Rights, the
one international bioethics treaty; and was memorably captured some years
ago in a Washington Post editorial in the ringing phrase: "The
creation of human embryos specifically for research that will destroy them
is unconscionable." Yet the Jones' Institute has brazenly announced
that they have done just that. And as Charles Krauthammer's recent
pro-stem-cell research piece notes, the cloning debate has focused the
same issue. The chorus of support for
Greenwood-Deutsch has been fed precisely by a scientific-industrial
community eager to clone and destroy embryos for scientific-industrial
purposes.
The problem, of course, is one of drawing lines; the challenge of
consistency. May a line truly be drawn that will permit experimentation on
clinically "spare" embryos, a line that will stand forever and in the
face, we may expect, of mounting commercial and clinical opportunity that
argues for their creation to order? That is of course the compromise that
has been floated in various quarters, most notably and seriously by
Senator Frist. The level of support for embryo cloning-to-order in
Greenwood-Deutsch, and now the timely "ocular proof' of the Jones
Institute, suggests the naivete of such policy hopes, since in the minds
of most of those who lead the call for "spare" embryo research only
there is only a modest distinction between this politic option and the
Jones way. It is a distinction that falls far, far short of what the Post
designated "unconscionable." It is not, as we might put it, that we
believe that further dominoes will fall; they are falling all around us.
For the logic of the experimental abuse of "spare" human embryos
depends ultimately on so meager a valuation of the embryo itself that
their creation-to-order is inevitable. If the embryo is at base object and
not in any sense subject, what is to prevent it? It is reported that one
celebrity recently announced here on the Hill and in defense of embryonic
stem-cell research that the embryo is of similar moral standing to a
goldfish.
Secondly, I do not propose to get drawn into the extensive debate
surrounding the relative merits of embryonic and other, typically adult,
stem-cells. Plainly, some and perhaps all of the good things that are
prophesied to be the fruit of embryonic stem-cells may be attained using
adult cells or other means. It is ironic, and to be regretted, that this
debate has sometimes seemed to hinge on whether adult stem-cell work is
likely to be as fruitful as the embryonic kind, as if the moral question,
while of some weight, could be discounted by a certain evaluation of
likely relative clinical outcomes. This is a profound moral debate about
what we will and will not do to our own kind, for whatever alleged
benefit.
Thirdly, I believe that we are losing sight of the middle ground. By
that I mean that it is by no means necessary to take the view that the
early embryo is a full human person in order to be convinced that
deleterious experimentation is improper. There are many possible grounds
for such a view – that we do not know if the embryo possesses full human
dignity and should therefore be prudent; that the embryo possesses the
potential to be a full human person and that such inbuilt potentiality
entails profound respect, a view widely held and deeply threatened in this
debate; or that membership in our species is enough to distinguish the
human embryo from all other laboratory artifacts. Indeed, the widely held
view that embryos should not be specially created for experimental
purposes itself reveals a strong if undefined disposition to protect the
embryo from abuse.
Fourthly, let me share my sense of dismay at the degree to which this
debate has sometimes degenerated into an iteration and reiteration of the
potential benefits of this kind of experimentation, as if those who oppose
public funding for what they consider unethical research are either
ignorant of or heedless toward disease and its sufferers. The celebrity
argument is a sham, an attempt to short-circuit the moral assessment of
means by the crass assertion of ends. It is an embarrassment to the cause
of ethics in public policy.
For the question we face is distinctly ethical in character. At the
heart of our conception of civilization lies the principle of restraint:
that there are things we shall not do, shall never do, even though they
may bring us benefit; some things we shall never do, though the heavens
fall.
As we stand on the threshold of the biotech century, we
could hardly confront a decision that is more onerous, since the promised
benefits from this technology may be great. Yet that is of course simply
to focus the moral question. If there are things that we should not do, it
is easy for us to refuse to do them when they offer no benefit. When the
benefit they offer is modest, the choice is still not hard. The challenge
to morals and to public policy lies precisely here, where the benefits
seem great. Yet it is here also that our intuitive respect for the early
embryo requires us to pay a price. In a culture fixated with the
satisfaction of its needs and the healing of its woes, it has become hard
even to say that we shall never, for whatever benefit, experiment on our
own kind? Shall we do evil, that good may come?
Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Ph.D.
- Dr. Cameron chairs the Advisory Board for The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity in
Bannockburn, Illinois and is president of Strategic Futures Group, LLC, which specializes
in higher education consulting. Former Provost and Distinguished Professor at Trinity
International University, Dr. Cameron has written widely on issues in bioethics. He is the
founding editor of the international journal Ethics & Medicine and is the
author of several books. He is a frequent guest commentator on network television,
appearing on ABC Nightline, PBS Frontline, CNN, and the BBC. He also
testified at the Congressional hearings on human cloning. |